| dc.description.abstract | This thesis explores some of the ways violence can constrain, inform, and otherwise
impact upon psychological theory, the ways psychological theory can contribute to
various forms of violence, and some of the implications of this reflexive cycle.
Arguing for non-violence as a truth criterion of psychological knowledge claims, the
thesis sets out to question the conditions of possibility for producing non-violent
psychological theory. Drawing upon contemporary theories of language, subjectivity,
and power, it discusses technologies of truth production in terms of violence. The
work of literary theorist and feminist post-structuralist philosopher Judith Butler is
discussed in this context. After developing a set of theoretical resources for
addressing reflexive epistemological problems of violence, some practice implications
of non-violent psychological theory are considered in relation to the specific domain
of forensic psychology. Returning to discussion of the broader theoretical issues, the
thesis identifies some promising areas of focus for non-violent theory development. A
key claim arising from this discussion is that the tradition of validity as
representational accuracy or referential truth is closely linked to the prioritisation of
power in many Western scientific, economic and other cultural enterprises. In this
context psychology can emulate other sciences and produce technologies for more
efficient control of subjectivity; but it can also use these technologies reflexively to
address the desires embodied in its own pursuit of theoretical power, actively
challenging the truth status of violent knowledge claims. The initial commitment to
non-violent truth is now articulated as an argument that a commitment to forms of
encounter with others that do not objectify those others involves a theoretical
commitment to validating knowledge claims in terms of social justice. This calls into
question the traditional hierarchy of “hard” and “soft” sciences, in which the truth
claims of psychology and other social sciences are positioned as having to conform to
the truth claims of natural sciences like physics and chemistry: a social epistemological
framework positions psychological theory as a key resource for assessing the truth
status of knowledge claims in other sciences. The thesis raises questions around this
opportunity, both with respect to some of the details of its possible theoretical forms,
and its possible political implications in academic, therapeutic and other contexts. | en_US |
